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Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls 
David S. Levine and Sharon K. Sandeen* 
Abstract 
Within the past few years, the U.S. federal government has 
been forced to confront the massive but hard-to-quantify problem 
of foreign and state-sponsored cyberespionage against U.S. 
corporations, from Boeing to small technology start-ups, and (as of 
this writing) perhaps Sony Pictures Entertainment. As part of that 
effort, Congress has taken up the Defend Trade Secrets Act and 
the Trade Secret Protection Act, which would create a private 
cause of action under the federal Economic Espionage Act. This 
Article addresses the possibility of introducing trolling behavior—
using litigation as a means to extract settlement payments from 
unsuspecting defendants—to trade secret law through creation of 
a federal private trade secret misappropriation cause of action. 
Like the existing problem of patent trolls, trade secret trolling has 
the potential to undermine the structure of trade secret law and 
create serious problems and costs for innovators across all 
industries. Thus, this Article addresses the heretofore unexplored 
link between patent and trade secret trolling established by this 
legislation. It assesses in detail the benefits and downsides of 
creation of a federal trade secret misappropriation cause of action 
and, for the first time, the risk of trolling. 
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I. Introduction 
For several years, the bane of the existence of innovators has 
been the possibility of being attacked by the “patent trolls,” also 
alternatively known as “non-practicing entities” or “patent 
assertion entities.”1 Concerned legislators have focused on 
                                                                                                     
 1. “Patent troll” is the popular name for “patent assertion entity” (PAE), 
defined as an “entity that uses patents primarily to obtain license fees rather 
than to support the development or transfer of technology.” COLLEEN V. CHIEN, 
PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES 4 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (describing PAEs in 
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deterring trolling activity in the patent space since the passage of 
the America Invents Act.2 There is a wide-ranging consensus, if 
not unanimity, that trolling has been a significant drain on 
innovation.3 
Trade secrecy has been generally free of similar trolling 
behavior, but two bills introduced in the last Congress, and the 
general perspective on trade secret law and practice that they 
reflect, could disturb that relative peace. The bills, the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 20144 (DTSA) and the Trade Secret 
Protection Act of 20145 (TSPA) (collectively, the Acts), likely to be 
reintroduced in the early part of 2015,6 would create a new 
                                                                                                     
a DOJ/FTC hearing on December 12, 2012). PAEs “make it economical to bring 
suit, and economical for the defendant to settle, regardless of the merits.” Id. at 
18–19. Thus, it should be no surprise that PAEs brought 61% of all patent 
infringement lawsuits from January 1 through December 10, 2012. Id. at 23. 
The potential trolling here is the hyper-aggressive use of alleged trade secret 
status to intimidate, vex, and exact settlements, not the acquisition of trade 
secret rights for the sole purpose of litigation. In that way, trade secret trolls 
may exhibit the same tactical behavior as patent trolls even as their alleged 
rights acquisition may differ. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–
212 (2012)). 
 3. Getting a handle on all of the impacts is a challenge. See CHIEN, supra 
note 1. The White House has explained that “PAE activities hurt firms of all 
sizes. Although many significant settlements are from large companies, the 
majority of PAE suits target small and inventor-driven companies. In addition, 
PAEs are increasingly targeting end users of products, including many small 
businesses.” EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION 1 (2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
 4. S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 5. H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 6. See Randall E. Kahnke et al., Top 10 Trade Secrets Developments of 
2014: Part 1, LAW360.COM (Dec. 16, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/603592/top-10-trade-secrets-developments-of-
2014-part-1 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (“Although it is uncertain whether 
further action will be taken as the current congressional term winds down, 
momentum is clearly building and a federal trade secret law may be on the 
horizon.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); David R. Pruitt, 
Will Congress Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act in 2015?, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 
12, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/will-congress-enact-federal-
trade-secrets-act-2015 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (“The House’s Trade Secrets 
Protection Act and the Senate’s Defend Trade Secrets Act are likely to be 
considered in early 2015.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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private cause of action under the Economic Espionage Act of 
19967 (EEA) with the commendable purpose of addressing the 
problem of cyberespionage.8  
As recent high-profile incidents reveal,9 U.S. companies face 
significant threats from those who would hack into their 
computer systems, including operatives of foreign governments, 
organized crime syndicates, and various nuisance hackers and 
thrill-seekers.10 Evidence even suggests that some governments 
are specifically initiating and supporting theft of U.S. trade 
secrets from private companies via unauthorized intrusions into 
computer networks as a means to further their own economic 
development.11 Other high-profile intrusions, like the recent 
unauthorized disclosure of vast quantities of information from 
Sony Pictures Entertainment’s computer network, remain 
shrouded in mystery; was the intrusion the act of a foreign 
government, or an inside job?12 Regardless of the perpetrators, 
the Acts purport to address these and other misappropriations 
that occur via the use of the Internet and other digital 
technology.  
Senator Christopher Coons (D-DE), one of the DTSA 
sponsors, stated that the Acts are intended to address the 
pervasiveness of foreign cyberespionage. As a press release from 
his office explains: 
In today’s electronic age, trade secrets can be stolen with a few 
keystrokes, and increasingly, they are stolen at the direction of 
a foreign government or for the benefit of a foreign competitor. 
These losses put U.S. jobs at risk and threaten incentives for 
                                                                                                     
 7. Pub. L. No. 94-12, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified in scattered sections 
of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012) (prohibiting economic espionage).  
 9. See, e.g., MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE 
UNITS 2 (2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf 
(discussing several major cyberattacks by a Chinese hacking organization). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1 (quoting U.S. Representative Mike Rogers, Oct. 2011). 
 12. See generally Sony Pictures Hackers ‘Got Sloppy’, FBI Says, BBC NEWS 
(Jan. 7, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30720003 (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2015) (discussing speculation on the source of the cyberattack on 
Sony) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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continued investment in research and development. Current 
federal criminal law is insufficient.13 
However, the Acts do not address, much less solve, these very 
real concerns. Instead, as this Article explains, the Acts are most 
likely to spawn a new intellectual property predator: the 
heretofore unknown “trade secret troll,” an alleged trade secret-
owning entity that uses broad trade secret law to exact rents via 
dubious threats of litigation directed at unsuspecting defendants. 
By initiating lawsuits designed only to extract settlement 
payments or massive damage awards from scared defendants, 
trade secret trolls could cause the same drag on innovation and 
job growth that has been the hallmark criticism of the well-
known “patent troll.” Indeed, as acquiring trade secret status and 
initiating trade secret lawsuits—which can include separate 
claims involving covenants not to compete, nondisclosure 
agreements, and labor mobility—are significantly less expensive 
and time-consuming than similar activity in the patent space, the 
relatively low barriers to trolling suggests that this activity could 
be very widespread. At any rate, the potential for trolling 
behavior is rather obvious. 
The Acts give rise to trade secret trolls by threatening to 
undermine decades of trade secret law and policy. Combined with 
an extraordinary power to seize a defendant’s assets prior to 
judgment, these dangerous Acts incentivize trolling without doing 
much of anything for victims of cyberespionage. Thus, this Article 
explains the risk of trade secret trolling by expanding upon the 
Acts’ previously identified infirmities and downsides14 to explain 
the scope of the potential problem and assess alternatives that 
would not spur trolling but would still address cyberespionage. To 
                                                                                                     
 13. Press Release, Office of Senator Christopher Coons, Senators Coons, 
Hatch Introduce Bill to Combat Theft of Trade Secrets and Protect Jobs (April 
29, 2014), http://www.coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/senators-
coons-hatch-introduce-bill-to-combat-theft-of-trade-secrets-and-protect-jobs (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. See David Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Professors’ Letter in Opposition 
to the “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014” (S. 2267) and the “Trade Secrets 
Protection Act of 2014” (H.R. 5233), CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC. (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/FINAL%20Professors%27%20Letter%20
Opposing%20Trade%20Secret%20Legislation.pdf (hereinafter Professors’ Letter) 
(urging Congress to reject the Acts on behalf of thirty-one U.S. professors). 
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be sure, the capabilities of trade secret trolls remain to be seen, 
but the risk is very real. 
To many, the trade-secret-troll threat born out of the Acts 
may not be readily obvious, primarily because the rhetoric 
surrounding the Acts focuses on the putative trade secret owner 
(i.e., the plaintiff) instead of the equally important businesses, 
including many start-ups, that may be wrongfully accused of 
trade secret misappropriation (i.e., the defendant). In other 
words, the Acts appear to enshrine trade secrecy exclusively 
within the realm of property theory, despite the fact that the Acts 
are putatively designed to address the torts of unauthorized 
intrusions into computer and corporate networks. 
To see the threat caused by the Acts requires an 
understanding of how the two primary theories of trade secret 
law work in tandem to create nuanced law that appropriately 
balances the prevention of bad acts with the benefits of free 
competition, information diffusion, and employee mobility. While 
tort-based concepts of improper acts and wrongful conduct by 
individuals and entities pervade trade secret law, a claim of trade 
secret misappropriation requires more than just an improper act. 
It also requires the actionable form of property colloquially called 
a “trade secret.” The existence of this property interest, when 
acting in concert with the tort rationale, operates to check the 
excesses of sole application of either theory. Thus, when an entity 
takes something through an improper act that is not a trade 
secret, it is not a trade secret misappropriation.  
The Acts and the rhetoric surrounding them fail to 
appreciate this seemingly obvious point. As a consequence, many 
of the bad acts that Congress seeks to prevent will not be 
addressed due to the absence of legitimate trade secrets. In other 
words, focusing exclusively on protecting perceived trade secret 
rights misses the point that what we really care about is 
preventing certain behaviors that are deemed wrongful (such as 
unauthorized computer hacking).  
Ironically, such is the historical purpose of tort law. In this 
instance, however, the hyper-focus on property rights has led 
Congress astray by creating a proposed tort that focuses more on 
alleged property rights than on bad behaviors. Thus, to see the 
threats posed by the Acts requires an understanding that not all 
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business information, and not even all secret information, has a 
property right of protection through trade secret law.  
Exacerbating the risks of passing the Acts is the fact that 
businesses often believe that they own trade secrets when they do 
not and attempt legal actions on alleged misappropriations of 
information unworthy of protection due to their suspect secrecy 
status. The narrow theoretical orientation reflected in the Acts 
has apparently blinded proponents of the Acts to that reality, as 
well as the harms identified and critiqued in this Article. Instead, 
this Article approaches trade secrecy from the more appropriate 
theoretical perspective of trade secrecy as a tort-based concept 
focused on wrongful acts, like cyberespionage, rather than tied to 
property and ownership.  
Additionally, seeing the threat requires an appreciation for 
the important and historical values of labor mobility and the 
diffusion and sharing of knowledge and information that underlie 
U.S. economic development. One of the reasons trade secret law 
does not involve exclusive property rights is because those values 
need to be balanced against the protection of trade secrets.15 
Unfortunately, the Acts ignore all but property values while 
reinforcing misunderstandings and misconceptions about the role 
of trade secrecy in innovation theory and policy. Instead of 
clarifying the law, they muddy the waters. Rather than 
addressing cyberespionage, the Acts point to one result: the 
advent of the trade secret troll, a beast borne of information 
control rather than diffusion. 
This Article discusses, in Part II, the factual and theoretical 
predicates of the Acts and their ramifications for the birth and 
expansion of trade secret trolls. Through discussion of the threat 
of the yet-unknown trade secret troll, it also frames the 
discussion about trade secrecy around information diffusion and 
the tort of misappropriation, rather than the problematic focus on 
property rights and ownership. In that way, the Article steers the 
discussion about trade secrecy away from the property-centric 
                                                                                                     
 15. See id. at 4 (“A hallmark of all US intellectual property laws, including 
trade secret law, is that they include limiting doctrines that are designed to 
achieve the appropriate balance between the protection of intellectual property 
rights and the preservation of free competition.”). 
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focus usually applied to tort-like thefts, about which innovators 
and policymakers are rightly concerned, and toward its 
traditional grounding in unfair competition law. Built upon this 
reorientation, Part III suggests alternatives to the Acts in 
addressing the threat of cyberespionage, primarily by amending 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.16 
II. Factual Predicates and the Troll  
To understand the threat of trolling—and, therefore, how 
trade secret trolls could emerge—requires an appreciation of the 
current state of trade secret law, developed in this Article by 
examination of five of the core factual predicates in favor of the 
Acts. Proponents of the Acts proffer these factual predicates with 
little critical analysis.17 Accepting the following factual predicates 
as asserted would foster an environment where trade secret trolls 
might flourish.  
The failure to adequately explore these factual predicates has 
been a clarion call that this Article seeks to correct. In that way, 
this Article seeks to engender a more granular understanding of 
the theory and practice of trade secret law for a modern, porous, 
and technologically-infused economy and society. The need for 
this analysis transcends the Acts, as trade secrecy is on the rise 
both as a commercial practice and a source of litigation. Thus, 
scholars and policymakers should apply the assessment and 
concern about incentivizing trade secret trolls described below to 





                                                                                                     
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 17. There have been two significant critical articles written about trade 
secret law reform, both opposed. See Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The 
Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber-
Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014); Christopher Seaman, The 
Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397567. 
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A. Harms: “We Know What We Need to Know to Pass the Acts.” 
A principal premise of the proposed legislation is that billions 
of dollars of U.S. trade secrets have been misappropriated in 
recent years and that trade secret holders need federal legislation 
to solve this problem.18 However, getting a fix on exactly how 
much information, let alone how many actual trade secrets, is 
being misappropriated and by whom is a difficult task, leading to 
a dearth of reliable data. Nor can the threat to trade secrets as a 
result of cyberespionage be accurately measured. As John 
Villasenor recently explained, it is “impossible to know how many 
trade secret misappropriation incidents are tied to cybersecurity 
breaches.”19 While Villasenor concedes that “there is good reason 
to believe that many of them are,”20 it is a fool’s errand to attempt 
to create a complex new federal cause of action under such 
uncertainty, as the likelihood of making things worse is at least 
as great as the chance of improvement. The certainty, if any, is 
that the Acts will do more harm than good. 
The aforementioned breach of Sony’s computer network 
provides a case in point. Although state-sponsored cyber-
espionage was suspected initially,21 experts in hacking have 
recently opined that the data breach was the result of a rogue 
employee(s) who, apparently, had legitimate access to Sony 
Picture’s stored data for years.22 If so, this event is an example of 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Argento, supra note 17, at 174–76 (discussing background for 
introduction of trade secret legislation); Seaman, supra note 17, at 4–5 (noting 
that “intellectual property theft is estimated to cost U.S. firms billions of dollars 
annually”). 
 19. John Villasenor, Corporate Cybersecurity Realism, Managing Trade 
Secrets in a World of Where Breaches Occur 9, 43 AIPLA Q.J. (forthcoming 
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488756. 
 20. Id.  
 21. See Michael S. Schmidt et al., F.B.I. Says Little Doubt North Korea Hit 
Sony, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/business/chief-says-fbi-has-no-doubt-that-
north-korea-attacked-sony.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22. See Dana Liebelson, Ex-Sony Employees Echo Cybersecurity Company’s 
Suspicion That Hack Was An Inside Job, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2015, 12:59 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/06/sony-hack_n_6425262.html 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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information disclosure by employees that is already actionable 
under existing trade secret law, rather than a new form of 
wrongdoing that needs a new federal cause of action. 
Alternatively, if this was a hack orchestrated by the North 
Korean government, then utilizing trade secret law will assuredly 
not be an effective remedial route for Sony.23 Moreover, it appears 
that much of the information that was allegedly hacked would 
not qualify for trade secret protection, rendering trade secret law 
utterly irrelevant to the issue. And yet, we can expect that the 
Sony example will be used to justify the need for the Acts.  
Another reason for the dearth of reliable data is the 
aforementioned lack of understanding of trade secrecy’s nuances. 
The methodology used to collect loss statistics is often based upon 
surveys by business executives who do not understand the scope 
and limits of trade secret law—specifically, the definition of a 
trade secret and of misappropriation.24 Without knowledge of the 
intricacies of trade secret law, claims of trade secrets loss tend to 
be overstated because the responses to the surveys are more 
likely based upon the layperson’s definition of a trade secret, 
which, unlike the legal definition, usually includes any 
information that a business keeps secret. Similarly, many 
business executives may not be aware that reverse engineering is 
a proper means of acquiring trade secrets or that the value of 
trade secret information, if any, must derive directly from its 
secrecy. Also, the surveys do not typically ask whether the 
respondents have been sued for trade secret misappropriation 
and how much they had to spend to defend illegitimate claims, 
costs that should be balanced against the asserted benefits of the 
Acts. 
We also have inaccurate data concerning the source of 
threats to trade secrets and the magnitude of the threat of foreign 
espionage.25 The existing data establishes that the bulk of all 
                                                                                                     
 23. For a potential framework to address this problem, see Lawrence J. 
Muir, Jr., Combatting Cyber-Attacks Through National Interest Diplomacy: A 
Trilateral Treaty with Teeth, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 73 (2014). 
 24. See Villasenor, supra note 19, at 10 (noting the difficulty in putting a 
number on trade secret and cybersecurity losses). 
 25. See id. at 10–11 (discussing the known, and unknown, threats to trade 
secrets and cybersecurity). Even if we assume that there are significant threats 
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trade secret cases are of the domestic variety, typically involving 
alleged breaches of confidence in the context of business-to-
business and employer–employee relationships.26 Trade secret 
cases based upon the alleged acquisition of trade secrets by 
espionage and other improper means are much fewer in number. 
Moreover, there is no data to support the assertion that the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) is unwilling or unable to prosecute 
the handful of cases annually that involve foreign espionage.27 
Despite the foregoing, even assuming (as we do) that trade 
secret misappropriation is a significant problem that requires a 
remedy, the United States already has a robust body of civil and 
criminal trade secret law that currently provides the most 
stringent protection in the world.28 Thus, it is unclear how limited 
statistics justify the adoption of a federal civil cause of action. 
Indeed, according to the recently updated Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development Trade Secret Protection 
Index, the current trade secret protection system of the United 
States ranked highest among the countries studied, receiving 4.5 
out a possible 5 points.29 This establishes—with as good a data 
set as we might currently find—that the current system is 
already doing great work protecting the trade secrets of U.S. 
businesses.  
The dearth of data, combined with a widely held but 
unsubstantiated belief that a federal private cause of action 
would help, will not help to address, much less solve, the 
                                                                                                     
of espionage from individuals who are located outside of the United States 
despite the existence of meaningful data, the Acts do not even begin to address 
those threats, as the proposed legislation does not have any extraterritorial 
effect outside of the United States. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 59–60 (2011); David S. Almeling 
et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 
GONZ. L. REV. 291, 303 (2010). 
 27. These allegations remain unsupported, especially as the DOJ may work 
with private industry in ways that do not result in prosecution, but rather 
support (i.e., assistance in conducting investigations). See infra Part II.C. 
 28. See Professors’ Letter, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing existing state and 
federal law). 
 29. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 2 
(2014), http://www.oecd.org/trade/tradedev/OECD-tad-protection-of-trade-
secrets-web-annotation.pdf. 
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unquantified problem of cyberespionage. Rather, a federal civil 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation is far more 
likely to be wielded by those who seek to exact rents from the 
unwary and utilize litigation as a method of competitive 
destruction rather than innovation.30 Thus, it portends the 
creation of the “trade secret troll” because there is a significant 
risk that a new federal civil cause of action for trade secret 
misappropriation will be used too aggressively by those who think 
they own trade secrets when, in many situations, all they own is 
information that they think is valuable or, as in the case of Sony 
Pictures, embarrassing. Until now, this eventuality has not even 
been considered, much less analyzed, but it appears to be a far 
more certain outcome than any other.  
To avoid the creation of trade secret trolls, detailed public 
hearings are needed. These hearings must focus on the range of 
interests at stake, from small businesses for whom litigation is a 
difficult or impossible financial burden, to civil society that wants 
access to trade secret information, to trade secret defendants, and 
to the federal judiciary that will necessarily be called upon to 
hear more cases. Congress must scrutinize the existing data for 
evidence that might support or undermine the assumptions 
baked into the Acts—namely, that foreign cyberespionage 
requires a federal private remedy. Policymakers should then 
balance this evidence against the costs of a new federal claim for 
relief, including the potential misuse of trade secret 
misappropriation claims to disrupt competition and quell 
employee mobility. In other words, the risk of trade secret trolling 
must be part of the discussion. 
Especially when compared to the many recent hearings 
involving copyright and patent reform,31 the Acts have received 
                                                                                                     
 30. See Professors’ Letter, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
 31. See Congressional Hearings on the Review of the Copyright Law 2014, 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://copyright.gov/laws/hearings/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2015) (listing eleven separate hearings in 2014 held by the House Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet on 
copyright reform) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Testimony 
and Statements, AIPLA, 
http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/congress/Pages/Testimony.aspx (last visited Jan. 
11, 2015) (listing a litany of letters and testimony offered to Congress over the 
past few years, most of which concern patent law) (on file with the Washington 
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virtually no critical attention and have yet to be the subject of 
any robust public hearings. Although public hearings have been 
held concerning the problem of cyberespionage,32 almost all 
attention has been paid to the voices of large corporations and 
their lobbyists who have focused exclusively (and naturally) on 
the threats to their valuable information. To be sure, this is an 
important concern that most agree needs to be addressed more 
thoroughly. However, there is another side to this issue—that of 
the defendants in trade secret cases, many of whom are the 
individuals and businesses that our intellectual property law 
policy purports to encourage.  
The voices of talented individuals who simply wanted to 
progress in their careers by switching jobs, only to be sued for 
trade secret misappropriation, have not been heard. Nor have the 
voices of entrepreneurs and small businesses that had an idea for 
a better product or service but found themselves in the midst of 
trade secret litigation because they hired talented people from a 
competitor company. Or, for that matter, any defendant who 
found itself on the wrong side of an aggressive trade secret 
plaintiff whose tactics, regardless of the merits of the dispute, 
caused it economic harm. The assertion of unfounded trade secret 
claims are torts in and of themselves that warrant discussion and 
evaluation in future hearings around the Acts.  
It is axiomatic that law must be based on the best 
information that can be adduced from the range of legitimate 
interests that exist within a policy area. Congress has not yet 
begun to gather that information. Thus, before Congress creates a 
new avenue into federal courts for trade secret plaintiffs, it 
should have a clear understanding of the impact, costs, benefits, 
and ramifications of such a path on trade secret defendants. 
Therefore, the voices of those who may be victimized by a 
putative trade secret troll’s aggressive litigation tactics, and 
perhaps more significantly, threats of litigation, must be shared 
                                                                                                     
and Lee Law Review). 
 32. See, e.g., Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property 
and Technology: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations, 113th Cong. (2013), http:// 
energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/He
arings/ OI/20130709/HHRG-113-IF02-MState-M001151-20130709.pdf. 
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with policymakers in the same settings that have been afforded 
large corporations and their lobbyists. Enacting the Acts without 
the hearings and debate is a surefire way to create the 
unintended harms associated with trade secret trolls.  
 
B. Law: “The Acts Create Uniformity Because Current U.S. Trade 
Secret Law Lacks It.”  
Another argument for the Acts suggests that the purported 
lack of uniformity in state trade secret law makes enforcement of 
trade secret rights time-consuming, slow, and resource-
intensive.33 Meanwhile, so the argument goes, trade secrets are 
being ferried out of the United States. However, the assertion 
that U.S. trade secret law is not substantially uniform is incorrect 
and misleading, particularly with respect to the key definitions of 
a “trade secret” and “misappropriation.”34 The assertion is also 
inconsistent with representations that the United States has 
made to the World Trade Organization regarding U.S. compliance 
with Article 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.35 This factual 
predicate primarily benefits trade secret trolls to the extent that 
it is believed, but it is simply not true. 
The fact is that U.S. trade secret law is very uniform due to 
the widespread adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA). The definitions of a trade secret and of misappropriation 
that apply in forty-seven states are the UTSA definitions (with 
some minor but insignificant differences in some states).36 These 
definitions, in turn, are consistent with both the language of 
                                                                                                     
 33. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 35 n.240 (discussing proposed benefits of 
the Acts). 
 34. See id. at 43 n.296 (noting that “the Federal Circuit has acknowledged 
[that] ‘trade secrets law varies little from state to state’” (quoting TianRui Grp. 
Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2011))). 
 35. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights art. 63.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; see also First Submission of 
the United States, United States—Main Dedicated Intellectual Property Laws 
and Regulations, Table AIII.4, IP/N/1/USA/1 (Jan. 20, 1996) (listing applicable 
state law). 
 36. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 36 (discussing the widespread adoption 
of the UTSA). 
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Article 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and the existing Economic 
Espionage Act because the UTSA definition was used as the 
model in both instances. In the three states that have yet to adopt 
the UTSA (North Carolina, New York, and Massachusetts), both 
applicable statutes and case law define a “trade secret” and 
“misappropriation” in ways that are generally consistent with the 
UTSA definition.37 So from where does this argument derive? 
Sometimes the perceived lack of uniformity is based upon a 
failure to appreciate the effect of other principles of law on the 
application of trade secret principles. Trade secret law, having 
been developed at common law in the United States, is closely 
tied to other areas of state law that, depending upon the case, a 
court will apply in trade secret litigation.38 Among these laws are 
common law and statutory principles of employment law, duties 
of confidence, antitrust law, unfair competition law, and civil 
procedure. Thus, when people complain of a lack of uniformity in 
trade secret law, it is often because of the application of these 
other areas of law and is not a result of a lack of uniformity of 
trade secret doctrine.39  
Significantly, the Acts do not address these ancillary legal 
doctrines; nor could they, given the fact that these doctrines often 
reflect the values and interests of individual states. More 
importantly, many of these state laws operate to prevent trade 
secret claims from being used as anti-competitive weapons and 
are, therefore, important constraints on the emergence of trade 
secret trolls. In other words, entrepreneurial individuals and 
start-up companies often benefit from the space that these 
doctrines create to legally compete and maneuver. They also 
provide the critical “balance” between legal and illegal behavior 
that all intellectual property laws in the United States are 
supposed to have. Their absence in the Acts herald the emergence 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Argento, supra note 17, at 178 (discussing the holdout states); 
Seaman, supra note 17, at 36 (discussing the three holdout states). 
 38. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 48 (discussing the interrelated nature of 
trade secret claims and other areas of state law).  
 39. See id. at 47 n.325 (noting that “even ‘under a federal trade secret 
statute, trade secret owners would likely be faced with geographic differences in 
the case law interpreting that statute’” (quoting AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW 
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AIPLA TRADE SECRETS COMMITTEE (2007))).  
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of trade secret trolls who will thrive in a plaintiff-friendly space 
built on the principle of empowering those on the litigation 
offensive. Use of the Acts will undoubtedly move well beyond the 
cyberespionage situations that they are intended to address.  
The argument that U.S. trade secret law is not uniform also 
evinces a lack of understanding of the practical significance of 
minor differences in the UTSA as adopted by a handful of 
states.40 More often than not, these differences involve procedural 
issues, such as the applicable statute of limitations or the burden 
of proof on some issues. In the few states where the definition of a 
trade secret differs from the UTSA definition, the difference is 
usually because the statute adds to the litany of things that can 
be a trade secret without really changing the uniform definition 
(which is very broad without an expanded litany). Efficient 
administration of justice and commerce in the U.S. relies heavily 
upon scores of uniform laws (including the Uniform Commercial 
Code) that, as adopted by the various states, are not precisely 
uniform. Thus, to use the asserted lack of uniformity in U.S. 
trade secret law as a justification for the Acts would set a terrible 
precedent and could undermine federalism by justifying federal 
legislation in areas that have long been the province of the states.  
Trade secret owners often perceive a lack of uniformity in 
trade secret law because of the fact-specific nature of trade secret 
claims and the fleeting nature of trade secret rights.41 As noted 
previously, a business will oftentimes believe that it owns 
valuable trade secret information when, in fact, it does not. This 
can happen because information can cease being a trade secret 
through proper disclosures of the information by others. Indeed, 
under well-established trade secret doctrine, information can stop 
being a trade secret due to no actions or fault of the trade secret 
owner. This reality explains why a trade secret plaintiff may win 
a case in one state in year one and lose a similar case in another 
state in year two. Thus, we should not mistake the failure of a 
                                                                                                     
 40. See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade 
Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 779 (2009) 
(discussing the benefits of creating a federal trade secret law, even if differences 
between states are small).  
 41. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 47 (discussing “fact-specific 
decisionmaking”). 
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plaintiff in a trade secret case to prove its case by a 
preponderance of the evidence with a lack of uniformity. Instead, 
it should be viewed as the proper policing of what is and is not a 
trade secret.  
The Acts will set the stage for the emergence of trade secret 
trolls by enshrining less uniformity, not more, into trade secret 
law,42 and by eliminating essential checks against plaintiff abuse 
of power. Underscoring this point, the fact that the Acts have a 
statute of limitations that is two years longer than that set forth 
in the UTSA creates disunity on its face.43 We should fully expect 
federal lawsuits after the time a state claim for relief has expired, 
a wonderful point of leverage for the trade secret troll. That 
leverage would allow for trade secret trolls to exact payments 
from defendants even as state courts have washed their hands of 
a dispute and potentially beyond the actual life of the trade 
secret.  
Moreover, as a practical matter, longer statutes of limitations 
maintain uncertainty and unpredictability about legal exposure 
that can stall innovation and progress. In the case of trade secret 
misappropriation, the greater the uncertainty that the law 
creates with respect to a potential trade secret misappropriation 
claim, the less likely that we will see the benefits of protecting 
trade secrets, like innovation and job growth. As many trade 
secrets do not last very long anyway, it seems reasonable to 
require trade secret owners to act quickly or lose their rights to 
bring a lawsuit because the alternative scenario of quelling 
competition and entrepreneurship is much worse.  
Several hypothetical questions illustrate how the very 
passage of the Acts could create less uniformity. When federal 
judges hearing cases under the new law encounter an issue (such 
as the definition of a duty of confidentiality or the meaning of 
“reasonable efforts”) that is not addressed by the law, what law 
will they apply? Will they create federal jurisprudence to fill in 
the gaps or will they use legal principles of a state? If the latter, 
what if there is no consensus on various issues of state law, like 
                                                                                                     
 42. See id. at 43–48 (discussing various ways that federalization may result 
in less uniformity). 
 43. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6 (1985). 
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application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine44 and 
enforcement of noncompete agreements, both of which can be 
tools of hyper anti-competition? For instance, will they use 
Florida’s view concerning the enforceability of noncompete 
agreements or California’s view?45 
Particularly while federal jurisprudence is developing to 
apply the new law, we should expect aggressive trolling to emerge 
while courts sort out what the Acts actually do and do not do and 
how to respond to their notable weaknesses. While the foregoing 
questions are sorted out, the trade secret troll will enjoy the 
unsettled terrain and perhaps succeed in keeping it unsettled for 
quite a while.46 We need to ask whether this disruption of U.S. 
                                                                                                     
 44. There is currently a split among the states concerning whether the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine of U.S. trade secret law should be recognized or 
whether it amounts to an improper implied noncompete agreement. Compare, 
e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), with Whyte v. 
Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002).  
 45. Although most states in the United States find “reasonable” 
noncompete agreements enforceable if they are designed to protect a “legitimate 
business interest,” there are significant differences of opinion among the states 
on the issues of: (1) what constitutes a legitimate business interest and (2) what 
restrictions are reasonable. Pursuant to a law dating back to 1872, California 
(arguably the most entrepreneurial state in the Union) takes the position that 
most noncompete agreements are void ab initio and that the use of such 
agreements to protect trade secrets is not a legitimate business purpose. See 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2014) (“Except as provided in this chapter, 
every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”); Edwards v. 
Arthur Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008). Florida is among a handful of 
states that are on the other end of the continuum when it comes to the 
enforceability of noncompete agreements. Generally, they are presumed to be 
valid unless proven to be unreasonable. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2014) 
(“[E]nforcement of contracts that restrict or prohibit competition during or after 
the term of restrictive covenants, so long as such contracts are reasonable in 
time, area, and line of business, is not prohibited.”).  
 46. Another argument in favor of the Acts is that it will be easier to explain 
and understand U.S. trade secret law if there is a federal private cause of action. 
So the argument goes, it will be easier for U.S. negotiators to get other countries 
to agree to adopt trade secret law similar to U.S. law if it can be easily 
understood. If that argument is being weighed, it should be noted that to the 
extent that creating a federal private cause of action under the EEA is designed 
to be a negotiating tool in current ongoing, albeit secret, trade negotiations like 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, it may actually have the 
opposite effect of making U.S. law appear scattered rather than targeted. The 
United States’ best argument for international adoption of trade secret 
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law is worth the marginal and speculative procedural benefits47 
that might result from a federal law versus a widely adopted 
uniform law. 
 
C. Plaintiff’s Story: “Without the Acts, It Is Difficult or Impossible 
to (a) Stop Fleeing Misappropriators, (b) Conduct Cross-Border 
Discovery, or (c) Enforce State Judgments in Cases Filed in State 
Court.” 
As best as the authors of this Article can tell, the most 
compelling factual scenario for the Acts is the first scenario 
above, the case of the fleeing misappropriating employee, 
particularly in multiple party cases when complete federal 
jurisdiction does not exist. The hypothetical (or reality) would be 
as follows: employee of company headquartered in state A plugs a 
thumb-drive into a computer and saves her employer’s trade 
secrets to it. Employee leaves state A and heads immediately to 
an international airport in state B. Employer and fleeing 
employee have limited or no contacts with state B, making 
employer’s willingness and ability to sue in state B questionable. 
Moreover, depending upon state B’s long-arm statute, acquisition 
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant may be difficult, and 
therefore the employer may not be able to interdict the fleeing 
employee in state B through state B’s courts. Federal law, so the 
argument goes, would allow for “national process” and the ability 
of the employer to more easily and quickly go into federal court in 
state A to prevent bad behavior in state B: to stop the rogue 
employee from getting on an airplane bound for a foreign country.  
The foregoing story, while compelling, has factual holes. 
While it is undoubtedly a challenge to deal with a fleeing 
employee or multiple parties located in different states, court 
                                                                                                     
principles and enforcement is the general success of our state-based innovation 
economy, which protects legitimate secrets while encouraging collaboration. 
While such a system could be improved, particularly on the access to 
information side, the Acts represent an unnecessary complication and 
bureaucratic layering rather than a solution. U.S. negotiators will have a much 
easier time explaining and justifying current U.S. trade secret law than 
explaining the muddied law that the Acts would spawn.  
 47. See infra Part II.C–E. 
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process, be it state or federal, is likely to be similarly 
cumbersome. Moreover, the magnitude of the problem (compared 
to all trade secret misappropriation claims) is not known. Given 
that many trade secret cases already land in federal court under 
diversity jurisdiction, the percentage of cases that could 
conceivably benefit from the Acts is significantly less than 100%. 
This is not only because some cases can already be filed in federal 
court based upon diversity jurisdiction, but because not all trade 
secret misappropriation cases would meet the “in commerce” 
requirements of the Acts. 
Proponents of the Acts have not adequately explained exactly 
the scenario about which they are concerned nor what is lacking 
under the current trade secret regulatory system, which includes 
well-developed processes for cross-state litigation and border and 
criminal enforcement efforts. Indeed, the DOJ already has 
protocols in place to handle these scenarios successfully. In a 
2009 U.S. Attorneys’ Bulletin, an author discussed exactly this 
situation, wherein “law enforcement . . . learns that the 
defendant may have misappropriated trade secrets and is leaving 
the country in 48 hours or may be leaving the company 
imminently.”48 The DOJ identified a typical example of this 
behavior: “The defendant is at the airport and preparing to leave 
the country when an experienced U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Officer notices something unusual and begins asking 
appropriate questions, revealing misappropriated trade secrets in 
the defendant’s luggage or on the defendant’s laptop.”49 Thus, the 
above is not a situation in which law enforcement lacks capacity 
and existing resources can prevent movement outside of the 
United States. 
Noting that “prompt decisions concerning border searches 
typically are necessary,”50 the Bulletin discusses law 
                                                                                                     
 48. Mark L. Krotoski, Common Issues and Challenges in Prosecuting Trade 
Secret and Economic Espionage Act Cases, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, Nov. 
2009, at 2, 12, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5705.pdf. 
 49. Id. at 12 (citing United States v. Jin, No. 04-cr-20216 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 
2008)). 
 50. Id. at 13. 
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enforcement’s ability to handle a scenario exceedingly similar to 
the primary scenario offered by the proponents of the Acts: 
Based on a tip, investigators learn of the misappropriation just 
before two defendants are boarding their international plane, 
requiring a decision on whether to arrest the defendants at the 
border. A search reveals that the defendants possess suspected 
trade secrets from four Silicon Valley companies, including 
technical schematics, information about design methodology, 
computer aided design (CAD) scripts, microprocessor 
specifications, and other technology information.51 
These latter two stories are not hypotheticals, but examples 
of cases that actually arose. Thus, the DOJ has the expertise and 
experience to handle such scenarios. The real problem is that it 
can be difficult to discover trade secret misappropriation of this 
sort, but the Acts do nothing to address that problem.  
Fortunately, contacting or tipping off law enforcement 
requires no court process and, if an actual threat exists, is 
undoubtedly a faster route to intercepting a rogue employee at an 
airport than attempting to get a court involved. Additionally, if 
the above scenarios include the element of surprise and the need 
for quick action, there will be nothing quicker than contacting 
law enforcement directly. In sum, it is unclear that the Acts 
would create a procedure that would be any quicker than that 
already in place. The law can do little to help companies prevent 
and detect trade secret misappropriation, which is a separate 
problem that we address below. 
With regard to concerns about the costs of cross-border 
discovery and enforcement, they are true to a degree because 
applicable federal procedure is marginally more efficient than 
having to seek discovery and enforcement orders in more than 
one state. Nonetheless, cross-border discovery and enforcement, 
particularly among U.S. states, is not as difficult or costly as 
some suggest. There are existing procedures in place both within 
and outside of the United States (including applicable 
international agreements) that are currently used in all manner 
of civil and commercial litigation. But because the Acts will have 
only limited extraterritorial effect, they will not improve the 
                                                                                                     
 51. Id. (citing United States v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
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existing conditions for international cross-border discovery and 
enforcement. In other words, while it is possible under existing 
language in the EEA to sue a U.S. citizen, a permanent resident 
alien, and even a foreigner in federal court for conduct occurring 
outside of the United States,52 this provision of law does not 
address discovery and enforcement proceedings in another 
country at all.  
Indeed, this factual predicate evinces a lack of understanding 
of the procedures that are currently available for the enforcement 
of foreign judgments and the conduct of transnational discovery 
(both among states and in foreign countries). Currently, forty-
seven states have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Act, which makes the enforcement of state judgments 
as easy as what currently exists between federal courts.53 
Essentially, the process requires the filing of an exemplified copy 
of the judgment with the appropriate court.54 With respect to the 
enforcement of judgments in and from other countries, the 
process is admittedly more difficult, but the Acts do not even 
begin to address this problem, and Congress has shown little 
willingness to join existing international agreements concerning 
the enforcement of foreign judgments.  
With respect to discovery, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do provide for greater ease of cross-border discovery 
than applicable state law procedures, but state law processes are 
routinely used by U.S. litigants and are not onerous. With respect 
to discovery in foreign countries, the Hague Convention on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters55 and 
the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory56 often apply 
to streamline the process, but, as with enforcement, the Acts do 
not directly address whatever discovery difficulties may apply in 
the rare trade secret cases that involve foreign defendants.  
                                                                                                     
 52. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2012) (discussing EEA application to conduct 
occurring outside the United States). 
 53. See generally UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (1964). 
 54. See id. § 2 (describing the effect of a judgment that has been filed with 
a court). 
 55. Mar. 18, 1970, U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241. 
 56. Apr. 15, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-27 (1984). 
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Finally, if the costs of cross-border litigation are a major 
concern of Congress, then that concern transcends trade secret 
law. But instead of approaching this purported problem 
holistically by aiding all commercial litigants, the Acts single out 
trade secrecy for special treatment without establishing the 
factual predicates for such exclusivity. Instead of solving the 
problems that exist, the Acts—at best and under very limited 
circumstances—create redundant procedures that are less 
effective against actual misappropriators than simply contacting 
law enforcement directly. Thus, the Acts would miss actual 
misappropriators but allow trade secret trolls to roam free in a 
confused and unsettled environment, threatening or initiating 
lawsuits for the sole purpose of exacting settlement payments, 
just like existing patent trolls.57  
 
D. Asset Seizure: “Existing Seizure Provisions are Inadequate, 
Requiring the Acts’ New Remedies.” 
Another argument in favor of a proposed federal civil right of 
action for trade secret misappropriation concerns the asserted 
need for a new “seizure” remedy to prevent spoliation of evidence 
and actual use of misappropriated trade secrets.58 Once again, 
the need for this remedy is unsubstantiated and appears to be 
overstated. Instead, this broad seizure power, even with 
attempted checks against improper use, is likely to be the most 
potent weapon to be wielded, and abused, by the trade secret 
troll. 
First, it is unclear from the language of the Acts why the 
existing power of state and federal courts to issue temporary 
restraining orders is not sufficient to protect the interests of 
deserving plaintiffs. Under applicable law governing the grant of 
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, courts 
already have broad discretion to order the seizure of information 
                                                                                                     
 57. See CHIEN, supra note 1, at 69 (noting that according to one study of 
patent trolls, “[b]ased on 900 litigations, in the majority of them, the legal costs 
exceed the settlement”). 
 58. See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 17, at 27–31 (describing the seizure 
remedy in the Acts). 
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and they are known to do so.59 Additionally, if the destruction of 
evidence is the concern, there is already a considerable body of 
substantive and procedural law that prohibits the destruction of 
evidence, including federal criminal law,60 similar state laws, 
rules of professional conduct, and the tort of spoliation of 
evidence. 
It is also unclear exactly why and to what extent such a 
remedy is needed. The vast majority of trade secret cases are of 
the “breach of confidentiality” variety, involving individuals and 
companies in some sort of commercial or employment 
relationship and the voluntary disclosure of the trade secrets by 
the trade secret owner. In other words, many trade secret 
misappropriation claims do not involve the sort of off-site 
computer hacking activity that is a principal justification for the 
Acts. Moreover, having voluntarily shared its trade secrets, the 
trade secret owner (if it planned ahead) should have the power to 
control such usage and to secure necessary evidence from its 
employees—by reserving, for instance, the right to search 
company premises, requiring the return of company property, or 
engaging in timely exit interviews.  
With respect to entity defendants (e.g., a new employer), it is 
standard practice for larger and more sophisticated companies to 
place a “legal hold” on documentary and digital information once 
the threat of litigation is known.61 Therefore, particularly in 
employer/employee cases, it is likely that both the plaintiff and 
the defendant will have procedures in place to prevent the 
destruction of evidence. Moreover, while the actual destruction of 
information taken by a former employee may make it more 
difficult to prove the misappropriation, such destruction is 
beneficial to the trade secret owner to the extent it eliminates the 
threat of wrongful disclosure or use of the information (the only 
                                                                                                     
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 65; see Daniels Health Scis., LLC v. Vascular Health 
Scis., LLC, 710 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding a preliminary 
injunction granted in a case for misappropriation of trade secrets). 
 60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012) (describing the penalty for destruction, 
alteration, or falsification of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy). 
 61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) committee note (2006) (regarding electronically 
stored information).  
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claim that is available if the information was voluntarily provided 
by the trade secret owner).  
Admittedly, spoliation of evidence concerns pale in 
comparison to the potential use and disclosure of trade secrets 
themselves; thus, the latter concern provides a stronger 
argument in favor of the proposed seizure order. However, the 
magnitude of the problem seems overstated in light of practical 
solutions that already exist and the existing power of courts to 
render temporary restraining orders. For instance, sometimes in 
trade secret cases the alleged misappropriator has no interest in 
disclosing the alleged trade secrets because it is in his own 
competitive interest to keep such information secret, and thus 
there is little need for a quick seizure order. Similarly, trade 
secret misappropriation cases have settled when the defendant 
agrees to box up and seal whatever information (if any) he took 
from a former employer in order to prevent the information from 
being used or disclosed. 
If, as appears to be the case, the proposed seizure order is 
designed to address the special case of espionage (cyber or 
otherwise), or more broadly the “improper means” prong of 
misappropriation, there is undoubtedly the threat of destruction 
of evidence because a foreign agent is likely to try to hide his 
tracks. However, as discussed in Part II.C, this is precisely the 
type of case that the EEA was designed to combat and that is 
likely to garner the attention of federal prosecutors, who have the 
power to obtain a search warrant. To the extent the concern is 
about federal prosecutors not acting frequently or quickly enough, 
that may be because there is little merit to the claims or because 
the case does not involve espionage but, rather, a dispute 
between competitors (which, as noted above, are the vast majority 
of trade secret cases). In an era of tight resources, trade secret 
claimants may take a back seat, particularly where the alleged 
trade secret(s) at issue may be nonexistent. It may also be 
because the EEA was adopted with the understanding that it 
would be used judiciously.62 
                                                                                                     
 62. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.64-5 (2014) (requiring U.S. attorneys to obtain the 
“personal approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the 
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, or the Assistant Attorney 
General, Criminal Division” before filing charges under the EEA); U.S. 
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Critically, the seizure remedy gives powers to putative trade 
secret trolls far beyond those possessed by current patent trolls. 
The seizure remedy raises the same concerns that killed 
copyright’s Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)63 and Protect 
Intellectual Property Act (PIPA)64 in 2011.65 Like SOPA and 
PIPA’s doomed provisions, the proposed civil seizure process is 
much broader than the impoundment remedy that exists under 
U.S. copyright and trademark law because it is not limited to 
allegedly infringing products. Instead, seizure would extend to 
wide swaths of information that need not include actual trade 
secrets. This powerful option makes the entire process even more 
suspect than existing copyright and trademark remedies and 
raises the specter of SOPA-like infirmities.  
The chilling effect on innovation and job growth of receiving 
a threat of litigation under the Acts could be profound. Under the 
Acts’ seizure remedy, mobile employees and fledgling start-up 
businesses might have the tools of their trade, including 
smartphones and computers, taken away from them based on an 
unproven accusation.66 Even if the Acts include heightened 
requirements in order to obtain a seizure order, the courts may 
never get the chance to adjudicate the issue. Rather, the 
adjudication may happen in the marketplace, where the recipient 
of a trade secret troll’s letter (which would threaten a seizure 
action) will have to decide if it has the capacity and resources to 
challenge the claim in court. If it does not—which would be the 
case for many potential recipients of such letters, from start-ups 
to struggling companies—the practical impact could be a 
settlement payment and, potentially, the end of the business. 
Innovation may be lost, jobs may be terminated, and lives may be 
                                                                                                     
ATTORNEY MANUAL § 9-59.100 (2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/59mcrm.htm 
(noting that the “EEA is not intended to criminalize every theft of trade secrets 
for which civil remedies may exist under state law”). 
 63. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 64. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 65. See Professors’ Letter, supra note 14, at 6 n.10 (discussing the demise of 
SOPA and PIPA). 
 66. See Seaman, supra note 17, at 27–31 (describing the seizure remedy in 
the Acts). 
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devastated based upon an unproven allegation or a seizure 
remedy improperly issued. That eventuality is SOPA magnified, 
and is a major cause for alarm.  
Moreover, the grant of this seizure remedy has no 
extraterritorial impact and, in any event, foreign courts are 
unlikely to enforce a U.S. court order issued ex parte without 
notice or an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the seizure 
remedy may actually be a godsend to those who wish to diminish 
U.S. competitiveness; they would simultaneously empower trade 
secret trolls with vast ability to quash U.S. competition, while 
arming them with orders that have no meaningful impact outside 
the United States, where the alleged trade secrets are 
purportedly going! On this basis alone, the Acts should be 
reconsidered. 
As if the above reasons were not enough to abandon the Acts, 
the proposed seizure remedy raises a number of constitutional 
concerns. First, any seizure or other preliminary order that 
requires an individual to turn over alleged trade secrets might, if 
complied with, amount to compelled testimony with respect to 
which the individual can assert the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.67 Moreover, it appears that the 
claimed need for a seizure power is being used to introduce the 
concept of a “civil search order” (also known as an Anton Piller 
Order68) into U.S. law. This concept is untested and of 
questionable constitutionality in the United States due to the 
search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.69 
In sum, even if issues concerning the scope and meaning of 
the proposed seizure remedy could be resolved, there are few 
cases when it is actually needed. Many companies already have 
evidence preservation policies in place, and when there is concern 
that none exist, state and federal courts have the power to grant 
preliminary relief and other orders to preserve evidence. In 
                                                                                                     
 67. See, e.g., Heddon v. State, 786 So. 2d 1262, 1263–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that employee’s Fifth Amendment privilege would prohibit 
forcing him to produce information in his possession). 
 68. Anton Piller K.G. v. Mfg. Processes, Ltd., [1975] EWCA (Civ) 12, [1976] 
Ch. 55 (Eng.). 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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egregious cases of alleged espionage, there is an even better 
search and seizure remedy available for use by criminal 
prosecutors. 
Even more troubling are the powers that the seizure 
authority would hand to the newly vivified trade secret trolls. 
Under the Acts, trade secret trolls would gain a powerful tool that 
could be used to significantly disrupt the business operation of a 
competitor. Although it is argued that it would only be rarely 
sought or granted, trolls, by definition, are predisposed not to 
worry that much about the merits of their claims because the 
greater the potential cost of litigation to their victims, the greater 
the potential for a quick settlement. Trade secret trolls operate 
based upon unsubstantiated threats of litigation, rather than a 
concern about losing in court. The Acts create conditions where 
trolling could become a highly lucrative business model, in which 
the sources of revenue are start-ups, innovators, workers, and 
society.  
Thus, while ostensibly designed to address the problem of 
foreign espionage, given the fact that most trade secret cases 
involve domestic parties, the seizure remedy is more likely to be 
used to disrupt U.S. businesses. The free-ranging power of trade 
secret trolls to disrupt and destroy competitors through 
aggressive use of the Acts is reason enough to pass on these well-
meaning but poorly conceived bills.  
 
E. Federal Courts: “State Courts Will Not Handle These Cases in 
a Timely Fashion, So We Need the Acts.” 
This somewhat baffling assertion ties to the general belief 
that federal courts are much better equipped to handle 
cyberespionage than their state counterparts.70 However, there is 
no comprehensive research or empirical data to back up the claim 
that state courts are ill equipped to handle trade secret cases. 
Instead, it seems to be based upon anecdotal experiences by 
certain plaintiffs in one or more states. Without examining the 
                                                                                                     
 70. See Almeling, supra note 40, at 794 n.109 (discussing whether state 
courts are able to address growing trade secret litigation); Seaman, supra note 
17, at 51–52 (discussing the new availability of a federal forum under the Acts). 
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actual record of cases when an alleged lack of response occurred, 
it cannot be determined whether a court’s refusal to hear or grant 
a motion for a temporary restraining order was actually based 
upon a lack of merit. The fact that many attorneys prefer to 
litigate in federal court should not be a reason for adopting a new 
federal cause of action. 
The reality is that most trade secret misappropriation claims 
are brought in the larger industrialized and high-tech states that 
have special commercial courts or business law judges to handle 
trade secret claims. To suggest that the judges of these courts, 
who are likely to see numerous trade secret cases during their 
tenure, are not competent to handle trade secret cases is 
unjustified. Moreover, it is an affront to the U.S. system of 
government to suggest that the incompetence of state judges is a 
legitimate reason to adopt a federal law. We have many bodies of 
law, including commercial law, that we rightly allow states to 
develop and apply even though the resulting litigation may 
involve parties from multiple states and countries. The Uniform 
Commercial Code is but one example. 
Far from being incapable of handling trade secret cases, state 
court judges are more apt to understand the social values and 
norms of their local community on such important issues as the 
meaning of “improper means” of acquiring trade secrets, the 
value of employee mobility, and the importance of free 
competition. They are also in a better position based upon the 
practices of local businesses and the availability of resources to 
understand what “reasonable efforts” are available locally to 
protect trade secrets. Lastly, unlike federal courts that often have 
to predict how a state court might rule on an issue, state court 
judges can actually make the rulings based upon their knowledge 
of state law. Thus, it is fair to say that state court judges will be 
and are as equipped to handle these complex matters and to 
identify the trolling behavior about which the authors are 
concerned.71  
                                                                                                     
 71. See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 17, at 55–56 (discussing the drawbacks of 
litigating in a federal forum); cf. Almeling, supra note 26, at 293, 301 (discussing 
the frequency with which trade secret litigation is brought in federal court). 
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III. Alternatives  
The risk of trade secret trolls, built around a primary concern 
about cyberespionage, has been largely absent in the history of 
trade secret law. They should be avoided, but Congress need not 
ignore the cyberespionage problem in order to abandon the Acts. 
Because there is no debate that trade secrets are important to 
U.S. businesses and that they are being misappropriated to some 
degree by foreign entities and agents, Congress should not simply 
throw its figurative hands up and walk away from the problem. 
Rather, Congress should consider ways to combat cyberespionage 
without damaging trade secret law and unintentionally 
summoning trade secret trolls. 
This Article proposes a reorientation of focus around the tort 
of misappropriation rather than the property concern of whether 
a trade secret exists.72 The following alternatives implement that 
theoretical reorientation. By focusing on the bad acts of 
misappropriation and deterring theft, rather than the asserted 
property value of trade secrets, Congress can avert the trolls and 
better address the real problem of cyberespionage.  
 
A. Amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act  
With respect to the most egregious forms of trade secret 
misappropriation—cyberespionage and foreign espionage—there 
are already two federal laws on the books to punish such 
behavior: the aforementioned EEA and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act73 (CFAA). The well-intentioned CFAA, designed to 
criminalize unauthorized intrusions into computer networks, is 
already notorious as an overbroad and ambiguous dragnet that 
implicates at least as much legal activity as it does illegal. Thus, 
it is in dire need of amendment to reflect what has been learned 
and experienced since it was enacted in the pre-Internet age.74  
                                                                                                     
 72. This concept is the focus of a work in progress by David S. Levine and 
Franck Pasquale currently titled Tailoring Trade Secrecy: The Moral Imperative 
of Industry-Specific Application of Doctrine. 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 74. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Aaron’s Law Is Doomed Leaving US 
Hacking Law ‘Broken’, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2014, 9:39 AM), 
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To more directly combat cyberespionage and enforce 
commercial ethics, the CFAA should be tailored to address 
current threats and existing bad acts rather than trade secrets 
specifically. In particular, the extraterritorial reach of the CFAA 
and the predicate wrongful acts should be reconsidered. Perceived 
problems with the existing language of the CFAA, which has 
exposed individuals to criminal prosecution for lesser acts of 
information access,75 can be addressed at the same time. Fixing 
the CFAA can provide a bonus for trade secret plaintiffs if it is 
amended to allow security researchers greater ability to 
understand and analyze modern hacking and cybersecurity 
tactics without fear of running afoul of the law.76 That research 
can be rolled into improving existing corporate cybersecurity 
abilities and standards. 
There is also a political bonus in this proposed solution. 
Because of widespread criticism of the CFAA, there might be 
broad and bipartisan support for its reform. As there is little 
debate that the acquisition of private commercial information (be 
they trade secrets, proprietary information or otherwise) via 
wrongful computer access should be deterred, we recommend 
amending the CFAA to directly prohibit such behavior instead of 
passing the Acts.  
 
B. Improve Cybersecurity Standards and Capabilities 
As explained in a soon-to-be-published article by Sharon 
Sandeen,77 the increased use of the “Cloud” to store and transfer 
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data undermines the trade secret status of stored information 
both from practical and legal standpoints. Congress might 
ameliorate such risks by enacting legislation to clarify that the 
mere storage of information in the Cloud (provided that other 
reasonable efforts are engaged in by the trade secret owner) is not 
a trade secrecy-waiving event. It should be noted that it is 
currently impossible to completely protect a commercial computer 
network from the most sophisticated and determined attackers, 
although intrusions, once detected, can be contained.78 
Nonetheless, the benefits of such a law might be conditioned on 
trade secret owners utilizing enhanced security tools, thereby 
providing an incentive for U.S. businesses to institute increased 
security measures.79 
 
C. International Harmonization of Trade Secret Law and 
Principles 
The existing international trade secret harmonization efforts 
are generally a good idea and should be continued,80 but even if 
the laws of numerous countries are amended to conform more 
closely to U.S. norms, there is still a lack of understanding among 
businesses in the United States and elsewhere about what is 
necessary to create and protect trade secret information.81 In this 
regard, self-help designed to prevent trade secret theft in the first 
instance is likely to be more effective and efficient than any new 
law, and without the negative consequences of trade secret trolls. 
The U.S. government should ramp up education in this area, 
perhaps by publishing Trade Secret Management Guidelines 
                                                                                                     
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490671. 
 78. See Villasenor, supra note 19 (discussing other means to protect trade 
secrets from cybersecurity intrusions). 
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similar to those published by the Japanese government.82 We also 
recommend training of state court judges to address concerns 
about their inability to quickly address trade secret 
misappropriation claims. 
 
D. Streamlined Cross-Border Discovery and Enforcement 
Because much of the concern surrounding the proposed trade 
secret legislation is about the asserted difficulty of conducting 
discovery and enforcing judgments across borders, Congress 
should examine whether it can improve and streamline those 
procedures. This would not only be of value in trade secret cases, 
but in other commercial disputes as well. Indeed, the benefits of 
the uniform law process in the United States should not be 
ignored, suggesting that many problems that Congress perceives 
might be more effectively resolved through the use of such 
processes.  
IV. Conclusion 
The debate around the Acts is decidedly not about the 
existence of harms. Even though trade secrecy suffers the same 
dearth of data that has made the reaction to rampant copyright 
infringement a guessing game between copyright maximalists 
and civil society,83 there is no question that U.S. companies face a 
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mounting and complex threat from state-backed cyberespionage. 
The Sony scenario should only add to the perceived urgency. This 
Article is intended to orient the discussion about the Acts around 
the tort of misappropriation, which is the problem of 
cyberespionage, rather than the property right of trade secret 
ownership. The Article squarely addresses the arguments offered 
in favor of the Acts and explains the shortcomings of trade secret 
law as a solution, as well as the downside risks involving access 
to information and collaboration. Of equal importance, the Article 
proposes alternative avenues of exploration that have a much 
better chance of offering relief to beleaguered U.S. companies, 
their customers, and all who value commercial ethics in the 
marketplace of ideas.  
We should all be alarmed by the possibility of creating 
conditions ripe for introducing trolling behavior into trade 
secrecy. Trade secret trolls have been unable to emerge thus far 
because of the strengths of uniform state law and the checks 
against abuse found in established trade secret principles and 
corollary state law involving noncompete covenants and invention 
ownership. But the free-ranging, plaintiff-oriented Acts will 
destroy that delicate balance and defeat the very purpose of trade 
secret law as a force of maintenance of commercial ethics. 
Simultaneously, the Acts will replace that balance by creating 
near-perfect conditions for the rise of trade secret trolls, moving 
cyberespionage from the first to the second most important issue 
in trade secrecy law and practice for trade secret holders.  
For the foregoing reason in particular and, more generally, 
for all of the reasons discussed above, this Article urges 
abandonment of the Acts and offers other possible solutions. The 
Acts do much harm and little, if any, good. Let’s leave trolls to the 
annals of science fiction (and patent law) and advance an 
environment where entrepreneurship, employee mobility, and 
legitimate access to information can flourish. 
